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Many traditional vote choice studies have focused on the so-called gen-
der gap, which refers to the persistent difference in partisan preferences
between men and women ~see, among others, Abzug and Kelber, 1984;
Conover, 1988; Mueller, 1991; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998!. A
less examined phenomenon, but one of perhaps equal consequence, at
least for parties of the political right who seek to satisfy core constituen-
cies, concerns what has been called the ‘marriage gap.’ Since it was first
identified by Plissner ~1983! in the context of American presidential elec-
tions, a small literature has emerged documenting the relationship between
marital status and support for conservative parties and candidates in the
United States. Perhaps understandably, given the relative paucity of liter-
ature even in the American case, there have been no published studies
considering the impact of marriage on political attitudes and vote choice
in other industrial democracies.
As discussed below, hypotheses that seek to explain the marriage
gap typically focus on two explanatory clusters: socio-demographic and
attitudinal. We suspect that both are relevant, but that more nuance can
be introduced into the broad dichotomy that characterizes the small extant
literature. There is some evidence that the marriage gap is a product of
antecedent socio-demographic factors. Flowing from this, there is con-
troversy as to whether these socio-demographic factors generate attitudi-
nal differences, or whether attitudinal differences are part of the general
conservatism produced by family life. Herbert F. Weisberg ~1987!, for
example, suggests that the marriage gap is merely an artifact of demo-
graphics. He finds that, from 1972 to 1984, most of the 10 to 15 per cent
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marriage gap in the United States is explained through two socio-
demographic variables: race and income. Simply put, married people are
most likely to be white and well off, and thus to vote Republican. Simi-
larly, Eric Plissner ~1983, 53! speculates that “married people are more
likely to own property and to worry about protecting it . . . .” Hence, they
are expected to be more likely to vote for parties of the right and centre-
right, traditionally more friendly to the property-owning classes.
Paul William Kingston and Steven E. Finkel’s ~1987! examination of
the 1984 presidential election, however, finds that the interaction of mar-
riage and home ownership has no impact apart from the additive effects
of either component variable. Put differently, mortgage payments appar-
ently do not drive the marriage gap. Instead, their multivariate analysis
indicates that the marriage gap is driven by attitudinal factors that may
not be grounded in socio-demographics. Married people self-identified as
slightly more conservative than either singles or those who had been pre-
viously married. Similarly, they took slightly more conservative positions
on selected policies—government aid to minorities, government respon-
sibility for job creation and living standards, civil rights enforcement and
individual responsibility. The differences were statistically significant, but
slight. Indeed, Kingston and Finkel conclude that the differences were pos-
sibly a function of the peculiarities of the 1984 election ~see also Plutzer
and McBurnett, 1991!. Thus, most existing research has not conclusively
identified a discrete set of issues driving the marriage gap.
Kathleen Gerson ~1987!, however, implies that the attitudinal differ-
ences among the married and unmarried may be more robust, especially
if family-related issues are examined. Gerson suggests that a dichotomy
exists between women motivated to pursue domestic responsibilities and
those committed to careers in the paid workforce. Divergent lifestyle
choices produce different voting patterns as the political battle lines
become more entrenched. Put differently, as the traditional family struc-
ture comes under threat, family values become more politicized. In Ger-
son’s words:
No one group now holds the ideological hegemony homemakers once enjoyed.
Instead, the contest over social legitimacy and structural support places domes-
tic and nondomestic women on a political collision course such that a victory
for one side is typically viewed as a defeat by the other. ~1987: 217!
Gerson’s work is the first to hint that if the marriage gap is both
attitudinal and robust, it is grounded in a more discrete set of issues than
merely a generalized conservatism. However, there remains an important
problem: her research on the marriage gap is gender-specific. That is, as
she portrays it, the marriage gap is grounded in defensiveness among
traditionally oriented women in the face of what many perceive as a
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feminist cultural onslaught. This is a plausible explanation, but it would
be instructive to determine if the marriage gap is equally robust among
men. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that women prize the institu-
tion of marriage any more highly than do their husbands. In other words,
perhaps the set of attitudes driving the marriage gap is not quite as lim-
ited as Gerson suggests, and instead extends to a broader group of issues
that are popularly conceptualized under the rubric of “family values.”
Of course, regardless of the basis of the marriage gap in the United
States, it is critically important to determine if the marriage gap is an
uniquely American phenomenon. One promising avenue is to extend anal-
ysis to another similarly situated post-industrial society that features stark
ideological polarization between political parties. Canada represents an
excellent choice. On the one hand, English Canada is broadly similar,
demographically and economically, to the United States.1 Thus, it presents
a good opportunity to compare the effects of socio-demographic factors
on the marriage gap. On the other hand, there are important social and
political differences between the two countries. An obvious example is
the socio-political salience of race. At the very least, we can test whether
race is driving the marriage gap in the United States: if the gap persists
in Canada, our confidence in the race hypothesis is undermined. Simi-
larly, we might tentatively speculate that language in Canada would have
some influence on the marriage gap. Until the Quiet Revolution of the
1960s, the Roman Catholic Church held enormous cultural power in Que-
bec, especially among francophones. Since then, however, francophone
Quebeckers have become more accepting than other Canadians of
common-law relationships. Thus, any ‘marriage gap’ in Canada could con-
ceivably be an artifact of ethnicity.
Abstract. A literature has emerged in American voting studies noting a “marriage gap”—the
propensity for married voters to support the Republican party. Using Canadian Election Study
data, we establish the existence of a significant marriage gap in Canada. We also seek to deter-
mine if the marriage gap is driven by socio-demographic factors or attitudinal ones. We find
that while socio-demographic factors contribute to the marriage gap, they explain relatively
little variance. In probing the attitudinal basis of the marriage gap further, we find that married
Canadians differ from the unwed very strongly on issues of moral traditionalism, but much less
so on other issues that measure generalized conservatism.
Résumé. Des travaux sont apparus dans les études américaines sur le vote remarquant
l’existence d’un “écart mariage” ~marriage gap! – la tendance des électeurs mariés à soutenir le
parti républicain. Utilisant des données sur les élections nationales canadiennes, nous établis-
sons l’existence d’un écart significatif au Canada. Nous cherchons aussi à déterminer si ce
phénomène est poussé par les facteurs socio-démographiques ou les facteurs d’attitude. Nous
constatons que bien que les facteurs socio-démographiques contribuent à cet écart, ils n’expliquent
que relativement peu de variation. En recherchant davantage la base attitudinale, nous consta-
tons que les canadiens mariés diffèrent très fortement de ceux qui ne sont pas mariés sur les
questions de traditionalisme moral, mais cependant beaucoup moins sur les questions de con-
servatisme géneral.
With respect to attitudinal factors, Canada also represents an ideal
opportunity to test nascent hypotheses generated in a literature that is, to
date, US-specific. A study conducted by the Angus Reid Group ~1996!
on behalf of the Pew Charitable Trusts found that Canadians and Amer-
icans differed significantly with respect to attitudes on traditional val-
ues, especially those pertaining to religion and the family ~see also Reimer,
1995; Corelli, 1996; Hoover et al., 2002!.2 As a result, it is logical to
conclude that if Gerson ~1987! is correct, traditional views on the family
in Canada are under even more threat than they are in the United States.
Thus if, as we suspect following Gerson, the attitudinal component of
the marriage gap is driven by a set of factors pertaining to traditional
views of the family, the Canadian case allows us to test this hypothesis.
It also allows us to determine, if there is an attitudinal dimension to the
marriage gap, whether it is grounded in a generalized conservatism, a
form of anti-feminist backlash specific to women ~as Gerson suggests!,
or a more particularistic conservatism, pertaining to both men and women,
revolving around the role of the family.
Data and Results
In our examination of the marriage gap in Canadian politics, we employ
data from the 1993, 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies ~CES!. In
those years, five major parties contested the election: the incumbent Lib-
erals, the nationalist Bloc Quebecois ~BQ!, the Reform party ~an upstart
party of the right that would become known as the Canadian Alliance!,
the leftist New Democratic party ~NDP!, and Canada’s moderate party
of the right, the Progressive Conservatives ~PC!.
Until 1993, with the brief exception of the rise of the Progressive
party during the 1920s, Canada had maintained a stable two-party sys-
tem that actually pre-dated the country’s founding in 1867. The Liberals
and Conservatives ~later Progressive Conservatives! featured fairly reg-
ular alternation as the governing party and party of the Loyal Opposi-
tion, albeit with the Liberals winning the lion’s share of the elections. A
third, minor party, which came to be known as the NDP, has contested
elections since the mid-1930s. This stable alignment broke down during
the 1990s, with the emergence of a new right party ~the Reform party,
later the Canadian Alliance!3 and a Quebec nationalist party ~the Bloc
Quebecois, BQ!, both of which have contested each national election since
1993, and both of which have served as the official opposition party.
Although it is always dangerous to seek to assign a starting point
to such events, the breakdown of Canada’s stable partisan alignment
appears to have begun under the Progressive Conservative administra-
tion of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ~1984–1993!. A number of factors
982 J. MATTHEW WILSON and MICHAEL LUSZTIG
compete for explanatory purchase. One is that Mulroney, anxious to over-
come his party’s traditional station on the opposition benches, engaged
in a dangerous game of regional politics. Specifically, in an attempt to
court electoral support in the Liberal stronghold of Quebec, Mulroney
alienated his own core constituency in Western Canada, most promi-
nently through two failed constitutional accords, while failing to earn
lasting support in Quebec ~see Nevitte et al., 2000; Laycock, 2002!.4 A
second explanation is that the Progressive Conservatives failed to dis-
tinguish themselves from the Liberal party on economic issues ~see Clarke
and Kornberg, 1992; Laycock, 1994; Laycock, 2002!. Finally, and in
our view most persuasive, is the hypothesis that the Reform party0
Canadian Alliance appealed to a socially conservative portion of the
Canadian electorate that felt under-represented in the putative party of
the right ~Lusztig and Wilson, 2005! and dissatisfied with the prevail-
ing “liberal consensus” ~Herman, 1994! among Canadian parties on moral
and cultural questions.
In any event, the PC party has lost significant support on the right
to the Reform party0Canadian Alliance. It is too early to say if this phe-
nomenon constitutes a permanent realignment ~see Carty, Cross and
Young, 2002!. Indeed, the PC and Reform parties earned a roughly equal
share of the popular vote in the 1993 and 1997 elections.5 On the other
hand, the Reform party0Canadian Alliance has won more seats than the
PCs in each of the past three elections, with the Conservatives seem-
ingly unable to recover from their precipitous decline between 1988 and
1993, when their seat total fell from 169 to two. In advance of the 2004
election, the Progressive Conservatives actually merged with the Cana-
dian Alliance, ending their long history as an independent political force
and forming the Conservative Party of Canada, which now seeks to com-
pete with the governing Liberals on even electoral terms. Whatever the
ultimate effects of the instability in Canadian partisan politics, however,
the emergence of a clear right-wing party with a socially conservative
agenda affords an excellent opportunity to examine the marriage gap in
Canada.
In partisan terms, we examine the marriage gap in two ways. First,
we seek to determine if married Canadians are more likely to support
one of the two conservative parties. Second, we want to know if any
such gap is particularly prevalent in support for the socially conserva-
tive Reform party0Canadian Alliance. Upon establishing the basis of a
Canadian marriage gap, we are in a position to examine its roots. It
seems unlikely that socio-demographic factors are wholly irrelevant. Log-
ically, married people are differently situated than the unwed, and this
should affect their vote choice. But do such factors explain all of the
observed variance in vote choice between married and unwed Canadi-
ans? While Weisberg ~1987! focused on income and race, we broaden
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the investigation to test for a range of potential socio-demographic expla-
nations, including language, region, gender, age and religious affiliation.
Assuming, as we do, that a marriage gap persists even after control-
ling for a wide range of socio-demographic variables, we are in a position
to explore its attitudinal basis. Here, as noted, three hypotheses compete
for explanatory purchase. First, the marriage gap may be driven by a gen-
eralized conservatism on the part of married folk. The basis of this hypoth-
esis is that married people take a more ‘sensible shoes’ view of life, which
extends across a wide range of issues. These issues include those pertain-
ing to fiscal matters, of course, but also may well extend to post-material
ones ~such as the environment!, constitutional ones ~attitudes towards Que-
bec!, and standard conservative biases that might be reflected in attitudes
towards immigration. The second attitudinal hypothesis, broadly consis-
tent with the work of Gerson ~1987!, is that the attitudinal basis of the mar-
riage gap is far more particularistic, grounded in an anti-feminist backlash
on the part of women for whom traditional family values are still highly
prized. Finally, the third attitudinal hypothesis charts a middle course, sug-
gesting that the marriage gap is not driven by a generalized conservatism,
but neither is it limited to defensiveness regarding traditional gender roles
on the part of women. Instead, this family values hypothesis suggests that
married folk, both men and women, are politically receptive to the moral
message implicit in traditional conceptions of the family unit.
Table 1 allows us to realize our first two objectives rather easily.
That is, it determines the existence of a marriage gap, and identifies the
partisan locus of that gap. In Table 1 we divide respondents into two
simple categories: married and unmarried. This dichotomy collapses five
more detailed categories presented in the CES: currently wed, widowed,
never been married, divorced or separated, and living with a partner. Our
marital status variable classifies as married those who are currently wed,
and as unmarried all others.
Two things are immediately apparent from these data. First, a signif-
icant and stable marriage gap exists in Canadian vote choice. In all three
election years, the percentage of married respondents supporting right-
of-centre parties is at least 9 points higher than the percentage of unmar-
ried respondents. Moreover, the size of the gap increases monotonically
over time, growing from 9.6 per cent in 1993 to 14.3 per cent in 2000.
Second, it is clear from Table 1 that the Canadian marriage gap is driven
overwhelmingly by Reform party0Canadian Alliance supporters.6 By 2000,
the Canadian Alliance vote share among married respondents was nearly
twice as large as among unmarried respondents. The marriage gap in PC
support, by contrast, is a consistently modest 1 to 2 per cent.
The fact of a large and sustained marriage gap, which exists for sup-
porters of both parties of the right, but which is far more manifest in the
Reform party0Canadian Alliance, provides the basis for more analytical
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investigation. Bivariate figures reported in Table 1 do not allow us to be
particularly discriminating in probing the basis of the marriage gap. The
results reported in Table 1 could reflect demographic differences, gener-
alized conservatism, traditionalism rooted specifically in social issues,
or all three. To probe more deeply, we explore the bases of vote choice
among Reform party0Canadian Alliance supporters. Given the locus of
the marriage gap in Canadian politics, it makes the most sense to focus
on this party. Given that the marriage gap was strongest in the two most
recent elections, in the interest of space, we have chosen to focus solely
on those. Thus, Table 2 reports probit models of Reform party0Canadian
Alliance vote choice for the 1997 and 2000 elections.
The models include items measuring both socio-demographic and
attitudinal factors. Socio-demographically, we find that certain charac-
teristics are strongly predictive of Reform party0Canadian Alliance vote
choice. Gender and language are highly significant in both 1997 and
2000, with women and francophones being substantially less likely than
men and anglophones to vote Reform0Canadian Alliance.7 Conversely,
Protestants ~especially evangelicals! and western Canadians are strongly
predisposed to support Reform0Canadian Alliance candidates. Finally,
we find weaker, less consistent effects for race, education, and age. Inter-
estingly, household income is not a significant predictor of Reform0
TABLE 1
The Marriage Gap in Canadian Electoral Politics
1993
Marital status9 % PC vote % Reform vote % PC0Reform vote
Married 15.1% ~224! 24.0% ~355! 39.1% ~579!
Unmarried 14.2% ~160! 15.3% ~172! 29.5% ~332!
Overall 14.7% ~384! 20.2% ~527! 34.9% ~932!
Total N 5 2609 Married N 5 1482 Unmarried N 5 1127
1997
Marital status % PC vote % Reform vote % PC0Reform vote
Married 19.1% ~232! 26.4% ~321! 45.4% ~553!
Unmarried 16.9% ~182! 18.3% ~197! 35.1% ~379!
Overall 18.0% ~414! 22.6% ~518! 40.6% ~932!
Total N 5 2296 Married N 5 1217 Unmarried N 5 1079
2000
Marital status % PC vote % Alliance vote % PC0Reform vote
Married 13.1% ~138! 30.2% ~319! 43.3% ~457!
Unmarried 11.5% ~105! 17.5% ~160! 29.0% ~265!
Overall 12.3% ~243! 24.3% ~479! 36.7% ~722!
Total N 5 1969 Married N 5 1055 Unmarried N 5 914
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Canadian Alliance support in either year, once we control for other
factors. In sum, we find that socio-demographic factors matter, though
not necessarily the same factors that Weisberg ~1987! and Plissner ~1983!
identify in the US context. Our findings clearly indicate that the mar-
riage gap is not merely an artifact of the voting preferences of a racially
concentrated economic underclass. Most importantly, we find that socio-
demographic variables do not account for all of the variance in vote
choice between married and unmarried respondents.
Indeed, the attitudinal measures in these models are also signifi-
cant. Not surprisingly, those who profess general ideological conserva-
tism and those who express dissatisfaction with the state of the national
economy under the incumbent Liberals are substantially more likely to
support Reform party0Canadian Alliance candidates. What is most tell-
ing, however, is that marital status remains a significant predictor of vote
choice even after all of these factors are accounted for. The models in
Table 2 control for a generous array of the most prominent conventional
explanations of the marriage gap. That it persists strongly even indepen-
dent of race, income, gender and ideology bespeaks the need for a more
discriminating investigation of its underlying issue basis.
TABLE 2
Probit Models of Reform0Canadian Alliance Vote Choice
Variable 1997 2000
Constant 21.21 ~0.37!*** 20.49 ~0.28!**
Married 0.26 ~0.12!** 0.17 ~0.10!**
Ideologically conservative 0.17 ~0.03!*** 0.57 ~0.08!***
View of national economy 20.25 ~0.08!*** 20.13 ~0.07!**
View of personal finances 0.05 ~0.06! 20.25 ~0.07!***
Asian 20.46 ~0.40! 20.43 ~0.32!*
Native 0.28 ~0.57! 20.56 ~0.58!
Black — 21.19 ~0.66!**
Female 20.30 ~0.11!*** 20.45 ~0.09!**
Age 20.00 ~0.00! 20.01 ~0.00!***
Education 20.10 ~0.03!*** 20.03 ~0.02!*
Income 0.00 ~0.02! 0.00 ~0.12!
Francophone 21.42 ~0.32!*** 20.61 ~0.15!***
Western Canada 0.90 ~0.12!*** 0.66 ~0.10!***
Atlantic Canada 0.06 ~0.22! 20.64 ~0.16!***
Catholic 20.07 ~0.16! 0.08 ~0.13!
Evangelical protestant 1.31 ~0.56!*** 1.66 ~0.33!***
Mainline protestant 0.19 ~0.14!* 0.48 ~0.12!***
N 899 1306
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.27
***p ,.01, one-tailed test
**p ,.05, one-tailed test
*p ,.10, one-tailed test
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In examining the specific issues fueling the remaining substantial mar-
riage gap in Canadian politics, it is instructive to divide socio-political
questions into two categories, those that touch on questions of traditional
morality ~consistent with both the Gerson and the family values hypoth-
eses! and those that reflect a more generalized conservatism. The CES data
afford us the opportunity to explore four questions in each category over
the two relevant elections. With respect to traditional moral values, respon-
dents are asked for their opinions on legalized abortion, homosexual mar-
riage, whether mothers should remain at home with small children, and
broader “traditional family ties.” Questions tapping generalized conser-
vatism consist of items on taxes, the environment, immigration and Que-
bec sovereignty. If married people are more conservative on both of these
sets of issues, this suggests support for the Reform party0Canadian Alli-
ance rooted in a broad-based generalized conservatism encompassing eco-
nomic, cultural and moral issues. If, on the other hand, the attitudinal
differences between married and unmarried people are confined to ques-
tions of traditional moral values, we will find strong evidence that the mar-
riage gap is powerfully rooted in one of our particularistic issue hypotheses.
Tables 3 and 4 present multivariate models of issue positions on rep-
resentative questions of generalized conservatism for 1997 and 2000. Here,
issue stances are modeled as a function of self-described ideology, mar-
ital status, and the array of socio-demographic controls ~region, race, lan-
guage and so forth! discussed above. The results provide very little
evidence that marital status is associated with conservatism on these ques-
tions. Only on tax policy ~and then only in 1997! do married people exhibit
significantly more conservative attitudes than do the unwed. In 2000, we
find significant effects only for immigration. Ironically, here the effect is
in an unexpected direction—married Canadians are actually more liberal
on immigration than their unwed counterparts, all other things being equal.
Tables 5 and 6 report exactly the same sorts of models, but this time
for particularistic issues of traditional morality. Here, the results are dra-
matically different. Even after controlling for both self-reported general
ideological orientation and religious affiliation, married respondents are
significantly more conservative on all issues in both years. What seems
clear from these data is that the residual marriage gap ~that not explained
by socio-demographic variables! is rooted overwhelmingly in a discrete
subset of issues. In other words, marriage among Canadians exerts a pow-
erful rightward pull, but only in the domain of social conservatism.
Having eliminated generalized conservatism as the basis for the atti-
tudinal component of the marriage gap, all that remains is to discriminate
between our two more particularistic hypotheses, Gerson’s ~1987! anti-
feminist backlash thesis and the broader family values hypothesis.
In both 1997 and 2000, initial evidence suggests that the marriage
gap is consistent across gender lines.8 Although in the interest of space
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TABLE 3
Positions on Non-Moral Issues ~1997!
Variable Taxation ~OLS! Environment ~OLS! Immigration ~OProbit! Quebec ~OProbit!
Constant10 23.10 ~0.24!*** 21.91 ~0.16!*** 21.83 ~0.23! 20.86 ~0.28!
20.24 ~0.23! 20.75 ~0.28!
Married 0.21 ~0.08!*** 20.03 ~0.05! 0.04 ~0.08! 0.05 ~0.10!
Ideologically conservative 0.14 ~0.02!*** 0.04 ~0.01!*** 0.06 ~0.02!*** 0.08 ~0.02!***
Asian 20.02 ~0.28! 0.03 ~0.18! 20.69 ~0.25!*** 20.04 ~0.33!
Native 20.11 ~0.33! 0.09 ~0.21! 0.43 ~0.32!* 20.63 ~0.41!*
Black 0.22 ~0.47! 0.59 ~0.45!* 20.62 ~0.43!* 0.69 ~0.75!
Female 20.13 ~0.08!** 0.18 ~0.05!*** 0.13 ~0.07!** 0.18 ~0.09!**
Age 20.01 ~0.00!*** 0.00 ~0.00!* 20.00 ~0.00!* 20.01 ~0.00!**
Education 20.04 ~0.02!** 20.01 ~0.01! 20.13 ~0.02!*** 20.13 ~0.02!***
Income 0.03 ~0.02!** 20.00 ~0.01! 20.02 ~0.01! 20.03 ~0.02!*
Francophone 0.14 ~0.12! 0.10 ~0.08! 20.30 ~0.11!*** 20.54 ~0.27!**
Western Canada 20.08 ~0.09! 0.03 ~0.06! 20.19 ~0.08!** 0.25 ~0.10!***
Atlantic Canada 0.05 ~0.14! 0.01 ~0.09! 20.05 ~0.13! 0.11 ~0.15!
Catholic 20.02 ~0.19! 0.16 ~0.08!** 0.20 ~0.11!** 0.06 ~0.14!
Evangelical protestant 0.05 ~0.37! 20.13 ~0.27! 0.05 ~0.33! 1.03 ~0.56!**
Mainline protestant 0.02 ~0.11! 0.06 ~0.07! 0.33 ~0.10!*** 0.10 ~0.12!
N 5 1019 974 1084 796





























Positions on Non-Moral Issues ~2000!
Variable Taxation ~OLS! Environment ~OLS! Immigration ~OProbit! Quebec ~OLS!
Constant 0.39 ~0.06!*** 0.36 ~0.07!*** 21.69 ~0.14! 2.19 ~0.11!***
20.17 ~0.14!
Married 0.01 ~0.02! 0.04 ~0.03! 20.12 ~0.06!** 20.03 ~0.05!
Ideologically conservative 0.18 ~0.02!*** 0.08 ~0.02!*** 0.22 ~0.04!*** 0.12 ~0.04!***
Asian 0.20 ~0.08!*** 20.02 ~0.09! 20.43 ~0.18!*** 20.46 ~0.15!***
Native 20.16 ~0.12!* 20.13 ~0.14! 0.68 ~0.32!** 0.30 ~0.24!
Black 0.01 ~0.13! 20.11 ~0.17! 20.72 ~0.31!** 20.38 ~0.27!*
Female 20.06 ~0.02!*** 20.07 ~0.03!*** 0.23 ~0.05!*** 0.00 ~0.04!
Age 20.00 ~0.00!*** 20.00 ~0.00!*** 20.07 ~0.00!*** 20.00 ~0.00!
Education 20.02 ~0.01!*** 0.01 ~0.01!* 20.13 ~0.01!*** 20.01 ~0.01!
Income 0.02 ~0.00!*** 0.01 ~0.01!** 20.00 ~0.01! 0.03 ~0.01!***
Francophone 20.01 ~0.03! 0.23 ~0.04!*** 20.14 ~0.07!** 21.54 ~0.06!***
Western Canada 0.11 ~0.03!*** 0.14 ~0.03!*** 0.03 ~0.06! 0.20 ~0.05!***
Atlantic Canada 0.07 ~0.03!** 0.07 ~0.04!* 0.01 ~0.08! 0.06 ~0.07!
Catholic 0.04 ~0.03! 0.05 ~0.04!* 0.21 ~0.07!*** 0.08 ~0.06!*
Evangelical protestant 20.11 ~0.08!* 0.11 ~0.10! 20.02 ~0.20! 20.18 ~0.16!
Mainline protestant 0.04 ~0.03!* 0.11 ~0.04!*** 0.10 ~0.07!* 0.08 ~0.06!*
N 5 2087 2132 2081 2048










Positions on Moral Issues ~1997!
Variable Abortion ~Oprobit! Gay marriage ~OLS! Mothers at home ~OLS! Traditional values ~OLS!
Constant 1.67 ~0.26! 0.66 ~0.18!*** 0.53 ~0.20!*** 1.06 ~0.15!***
2.89 ~0.26!
Married 0.37 ~0.08!*** 0.32 ~0.06!*** 0.23 ~0.07!*** 0.19 ~0.05!***
Ideologically conservative 0.10 ~0.02!*** 0.08 ~0.01!*** 0.10 ~0.02!*** 0.08 ~0.01!***
Asian 0.19 ~0.28! 0.26 ~0.21! 0.19 ~0.24! 0.32 ~0.18!**
Native 20.04 ~0.35! 20.11 ~0.25! 20.11 ~0.27! 0.06 ~0.23!
Black 0.48 ~0.43! 0.26 ~0.37! 0.07 ~0.40! 0.18 ~0.30!
Female 20.13 ~0.08!* 20.29 ~0.06!*** 20.06 ~0.07! 20.08 ~0.05!*
Age 0.01 ~0.00!** 0.02 ~0.00!*** 0.02 ~0.00!*** 0.01 ~0.00!***
Education 20.00 ~0.02! 20.04 ~0.01!*** 20.08 ~0.02!*** 20.05 ~0.01!***
Income 20.05 ~0.02!*** 20.03 ~0.01!*** 20.06 ~0.01!*** 20.02 ~0.01!**
Francophone 20.41 ~0.12!*** 20.27 ~0.09!*** 20.21 ~0.10!** 20.08 ~0.07!
Western Canada 0.04 ~0.09! 20.05 ~0.07! 0.07 ~0.08! 20.04 ~0.06!
Atlantic Canada 0.21 ~0.14!* 0.01 ~0.11! 0.01 ~0.12! 0.13 ~0.09!*
Catholic 0.88 ~0.13!*** 0.46 ~0.09!*** 0.27 ~0.10!*** 0.39 ~0.07!***
Evangelical protestant 1.64 ~0.33!*** 1.28 ~0.29!*** 0.93 ~0.30!*** 0.90 ~0.22!***
Mainline protestant 0.48 ~0.12!*** 0.36 ~0.08!*** 0.21 ~0.09!** 0.28 ~0.07!***
N 5 1090 1009 1067 1059





























Positions on Moral Issues ~2000!
Variable Abortion ~OLS! Gay marriage ~OLS! Women’s roles ~OLS! Traditional values ~OLS!
Constant 1.26 ~0.12!*** 0.62 ~0.13!*** 0.63 ~0.13!*** 1.38 ~0.14!***
Married 0.18 ~0.05!*** 0.18 ~0.05!*** 0.28 ~0.05!*** 0.21 ~0.06!***
Ideologically conservative 0.15 ~0.04!*** 0.31 ~0.04!*** 0.19 ~0.04!*** 0.31 ~0.04!***
Asian 0.40 ~0.16!*** 0.50 ~0.17!*** 0.12 ~0.17! 0.05 ~0.19!
Native 0.61 ~0.24!*** 0.21 ~0.28! 20.48 ~0.27!** 20.19 ~0.32!
Black 20.18 ~0.29! 0.71 ~0.30!*** 0.16 ~0.29! 20.41 ~0.45!
Female 0.03 ~0.04! 20.32 ~0.05!*** 0.14 ~0.05!*** 20.02 ~0.05!
Age 0.00 ~0.00! 0.02 ~0.00!*** 0.02 ~0.00!*** 0.01 ~0.00!***
Education 20.05 ~0.01!*** 20.06 ~0.01!*** 20.07 ~0.01!*** 20.07 ~0.01!***
Income 20.04 ~0.01!*** 20.03 ~0.01!*** 20.04 ~0.01!*** 20.02 ~0.01!**
Francophone 20.43 ~0.07!*** 20.13 ~0.07!** 20.05 ~0.07! 20.05 ~0.08!
Western Canada 0.04 ~0.06! 20.00 ~0.06! 0.20 ~0.06!*** 20.01 ~0.06!
Atlantic Canada 0.15 ~0.07!** 20.06 ~0.08! 20.14 ~0.08!** 0.01 ~0.08!
Catholic 0.34 ~0.06!*** 0.21 ~0.07!*** 0.20 ~0.07!*** 0.37 ~0.07!***
Evangelical protestant 0.92 ~0.17!*** 1.02 ~0.19!*** 0.60 ~0.19!*** 0.83 ~0.19!***
Mainline protestant 0.15 ~0.06!*** 0.30 ~0.07!*** 0.17 ~0.07!*** 0.26 ~0.07!***
N 5 1623 1990 2053 969









no tabular data are reported, our findings are easily summarized. Among
women, the marriage gap in Reform0Canadian Alliance support is 8.5
per cent in 1997 and 12.9 per cent in 2000. For men, the figures are a
comparable 7.6 per cent and 12.4 per cent, respectively. This is indica-
tive of a marital basis for partisanship that is more consistent with the
family values hypothesis than with Gerson’s gender-specific one.
These findings are reinforced by multivariate analysis. The results
reported in Table 7 disaggregate the marital status variable by gender,
which proved so highly predictive of attitudes toward moral issues in
Tables 5 and 6. The results strongly support the family values hypoth-
esis. In both years, on all four moral issues examined, marriage is a sig-
nificant predictor of support for traditional values among both women
and men. These results allow us to set aside Gerson’s anti-feminist back-
lash hypothesis in favour of our broader family values one.
Conclusion
This paper expands, both conceptually and comparatively, the as yet under-
developed literature addressing the fact that married Americans tend to
be more likely than their unwed fellow citizens to vote for the party of
the right. With only a couple of exceptions, most observers of the mar-
riage gap in the United States have attributed it to a socio-demographic
artifact: the fact that the economic underclass, disproportionately African-
American and unmarried, tends to vote Democratic ~Plissner, 1983; Weis-
berg, 1987!. While our findings also indicate that socio-demographic
factors affect the marriage gap, we find that race contributes weakly, and
income not at all. Moreover, we find that the marriage gap survives; that
TABLE 7
The Marriage Gap on Moral Issues, by Gender ~1997 & 2000!12
1997
Gender Abortion Gay marriage Women’s roles Traditional values
Men 0.37 ~0.11!*** 0.24 ~0.08!*** 0.14 ~0.09!* 0.12 ~0.07!**
Women 0.41 ~0.13!*** 0.45 ~0.09!*** 0.35 ~0.11!*** 0.28 ~0.08!***
N 5 605 M, 485 W 559 M, 450 W 590 M, 477 W 591 M, 468 W
R2 5 0.09 M, 0.09 W 0.22 M, 0.28 W 0.21 M, 0.21 W 0.20 M, 0.23 W
2000
Gender Abortion Gay marriage Women’s roles Traditional values
Men 0.17 ~0.07!*** 0.23 ~0.07!*** 0.28 ~0.07!*** 0.21 ~0.08!***
Women 0.21 ~0.08!*** 0.10 ~0.08!* 0.32 ~0.08!*** 0.21 ~0.09!***
N 5 917 M, 706 W 1106 M, 884 W 1121 M, 932 W 529 M, 440 W
R2 5 0.13 M, 0.16 W 0.18 M, 0.21 W 0.15 M, 0.17 W 0.22 M, 0.23 W
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is, remains statistically significant, even after controlling for all poten-
tially relevant socio-demographic factors.
Clearly then, as some of the US literature suggests, at least part of
the marriage gap is driven by attitudinal factors. We test three competing
attitudinal hypotheses. First, following Kingston and Finkel ~1987!, we
examine whether the responsibilities of married life breed a generalized
conservatism among married voters. We find that this hypothesis holds
virtually no explanatory purchase. Marital status is not a significant and
consistent predictor of positions on any non-moral issue in the elections
that we examine, and for at least one issue ~immigration in 2000! mar-
ried folk are more liberal than their unwed counterparts.
A second attitudinal hypothesis, articulated by Gerson ~1987!, sug-
gests that the marriage gap is driven by women. Specifically, married
women are more likely to place a higher premium on traditional gender
roles as they pertain to the family. Sensing a cultural shift away from
traditional gender roles, Gerson argues, married women are more likely
to support parties of the right. That is, they will support the party per-
ceived as most resistant to the cultural changes they find most threaten-
ing. Our findings in Tables 5 and 6 are potentially consistent with this
view—certainly, married women in our study are much more support-
ive of Reform0Canadian Alliance candidates, and exhibit sharply more
traditional social and moral views, than single women. However, when
we examine the results in Table 7 a more comprehensive picture emerges.
Consistent with our third, family values hypothesis, we find two issues
of note. First, the size of the marriage gap is insensitive to gender—
married men differ from their single counterparts just as strongly as do
married women from theirs. Second, the range of issues that we exam-
ine takes us beyond the narrowly tailored question of women’s social
roles. In other words, while the Gerson hypothesis appears to have some
merit, its explanatory value is subsumed in our larger, more theoreti-
cally comprehensive framework.
The findings in this paper speak to the need for broader, and partic-
ularly more comparative, analysis of the marriage gap first noted in Amer-
ican politics. Our examination of Canada has allowed us to transcend the
specifically American ~and possibly spurious! racial and economic expla-
nations for the marriage gap, and to identify a more precise and gener-
alizable attitudinal basis. Analysis of the Canadian case, moreover, may
help to identify constituencies for socially conservative parties of the right.
Indeed, elsewhere we have argued that the Reform party0Canadian
Alliance’s ability to displace the Conservatives as the dominant party of
the Canadian right was largely a function of precisely the set of issues
that we find here as contributors to the marriage gap ~Lusztig and Wilson,
2005!. Future research should trace the implications of these findings
for other advanced industrial democracies.
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Notes
1 The obvious distinctions, of course, are the political importance of race in the United
States and language in Canada.
2 The study was conducted by telephone from September 19 to October 10, 1996. The
sample consisted of 6,023 interviews divided roughly equally between Canadian and
American respondents.
3 There are several excellent analyses of the rise of the Reform party. See, for exam-
ple, Archer and Ellis ~1994!; Laycock ~1994; 2002!; and Nevitte et al. ~1998!.
4 Both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Constitutional Accords were perceived in
western Canada to pander to the interests of Quebec, and ultimately helped to under-
mine PC support in the West ~Lusztig, 1994!. Equally damaging was the 1986 Bris-
tol Aerospace incident, in which Montreal-based Canadair was awarded a CF-18
maintenance contract, despite a lower bid from Bristol Aerospace, located in Winni-
peg ~Flanagan, 1995!.
5 In 1993, the Reform party won 19 per cent of the popular vote and 52 seats; the PC
won 16 per cent of the vote, but only two seats. In 1997, Reform’s numbers were 19
per cent ~60 seats!, while the PC won 19 per cent and 20 seats. In 2000, the Cana-
dian Alliance significantly outperformed the PC, taking 26 per cent of the popular
vote to 12 per cent, and 66 seats to 12.
6 After the 1997 election, in an attempt to generate more appeal in Central Canada
~ostensibly the province of Ontario!, the Reform party merged with disaffected mem-
bers of the Progressive Conservative Party to form the Canadian Alliance.
7 This would seem to suggest that any possible remnants of a pre-Quiet Revolution
conservatism, if they exist, do not translate to support among francophones for
Canada’s most conservative political party. Of course, this is not surprising given the
Reform0Canadian Alliance stance on constitutional and linguistic issues.
8 This is not to say, of course, that men and women are equally committed to voting
for the Reform0Canadian Alliance party. While a gender gap certainly does exist, our
point is that the gender gap does not drive the marriage gap. For more on the gender
gap in Canadian partisan politics see O’Neill ~2001!; Erickson and O’Neill ~2002!;
and Gidengil et al. ~2002!.
9 Married respondents are those married and living together. Unmarried respondents
are all others.
10 For ordered probit models, reported “constant” values reflect the two cut-points of
the estimated model.
11 For ordered probits, values reflect a pseudo r-squared calculation.
12 Entries represent coefficients and standard errors, by gender, for the marital status
variable in the model reported in Tables 5 and 6 above. Full results for the gender-
specific models are available from the authors.
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